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Get Out of My Driveway! Collins v. Virginia Protects Curtilage from Being Trampled by 
the Automobile Exception  
 
 
Abstract 
In Collins v. Virginia (2018), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the automobile exception cannot 
justify a warrantless search of an automobile parked in a home’s curtilage because the 
automobile exception pertains solely to the search of the automobile, not to the intrusion upon 
the Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the home’s curtilage.  After giving an overview of 
relevant Fourth Amendment jurisprudence concerning the curtilage doctrine and the automobile 
exception as well as the history of the exclusionary rule, this article examines the majority, 
concurring, and dissenting opinions in Collins and discusses the implications of this important 
decision.  Collins preserves the heightened Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the home 
and its curtilage by refusing to further expand the automobile exception. Collins is also notable 
for Justice Thomas’s concurrence, which questions the Court’s authority to impose the 
exclusionary rule upon the states.  Given the changing composition of the Court, the Court’s 
eventual reconsideration of the exclusionary rule’s applicability to the states is a possibility that 
bears watching.           
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Fourth Amendment, automobile exception, curtilage, exclusionary rule, warrant, 
search  
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Get Out of My Driveway! Collins v. Virginia Protects Curtilage from Being Trampled by 
the Automobile Exception  
     I. Introduction 
 Generally, the police are required to obtain a warrant prior to conducting a search to 
comply with the Fourth Amendment.1  This protection is especially important for preserving 
privacy in the home and its immediately surrounding area, or curtilage.2  Thus, unless there are 
exigent circumstances, when a police officer conducts a search of a home or its curtilage, the 
officer must first obtain a warrant.3     
While police officers are generally required to obtain a warrant prior to conducting a 
search, this requirement is subject to certain exceptions -- including the automobile exception.4  
Under the automobile exception, police may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile 
without violating the Fourth Amendment, as long as the search is supported by probable cause.5  
But what happens when these two doctrines, the automobile exception and the curtilage doctrine, 
intersect?  Are the police required to obtain a warrant prior to searching an automobile which is 
parked within a home’s curtilage?     
In Collins v. Virginia (2018),6 the U.S. Supreme Court was confronted with this question.  
The Court held that the automobile exception cannot justify a warrantless search of an 
automobile parked in a home’s curtilage because the automobile exception pertains only to the 
search of the automobile, not to the separate intrusion represented by an officer’s entry of the 
                                                          
1 See Kendra Hillman Chilcoat, The Automobile Exception Swallows the Rule: Florida v. White, 90 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 917, 918 (1999-2000); Lewis R. Katz,The Automobile Exception Transformed: The Rise of a Public 
Place Exemption to the Warrant Requirement, 36 Cas. W. Res. L. Rev. 375, 383 (1986).     
2 Brent E. Newton, The Real-World Fourth Amendment, 43 Hastings Const. L.Q. 759, 786 (2016).    
3 Laura K. Donohue, The Fourth Amendment in a Digital World, 71 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 553, 564 (2017).  
4 Chilcoat, supra note 1, at 917-19.  
5 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).  
6 Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. ____, 201 L. Ed. 2d 9 (2018).  
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curtilage to gain access to the automobile.7  In so holding, the Court refused to expand the 
automobile exception in a way which would impede the heightened Fourth Amendment 
protection accorded to the home and its curtilage,8 thus preserving the idea of home as inviolable 
castle which underpins Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.9  In addition to this important holding, 
another notable aspect of Collins is Justice Thomas’s concurrence, which questions the Court’s 
authority to impose the exclusionary rule upon the states and suggests that the Court should re-
examine this issue in the near future.10 
This article examines the Court’s analysis in Collins and the implications of the Court’s 
decision.  The article begins with an overview of relevant Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
concerning the curtilage doctrine and the automobile exception to provide context for the Collins 
decision.  It then traces the history of the exclusionary rule, providing a foundation for 
understanding Justice Thomas’s argument.  The article next examines the majority, concurring, 
and dissenting opinions in Collins.  Finally, the implications of this important decision are 
discussed.  
     II. Overview of Relevant Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence 
The Fourth Amendment protects our persons, houses, papers, and effects from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.11  In determining whether the conduct of a government actor 
constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the Court traditionally 
analyzed whether a person’s property rights were physically intruded upon.12  In Katz v. United 
                                                          
7 Collins, 201 L. Ed. 2d at 20-24. 
8 See id. 
9 See Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment, 95 Cornell L. 
Rev. 905, 906, 912-15 (2010).   
10 Collins, 201 L. Ed. 2d at 24-29 (Thomas, J., concurring).   
11 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
12 Jeremy J. Justice, Do Residents of Multi-Unit Dwellings Have Fourth Amendment Protections in Their Locked 
Common Area After Florida v. Jardines Established the Customary Invitation Standard, 62 Wayne L. Rev. 305, 
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States (1967),13 the Court adopted a new approach to analyzing whether a search has occurred by 
focusing on whether the government conduct violated a person’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy.14  After Katz, courts have generally used a reasonable expectation of privacy analysis to 
determine whether government action constitutes a search.15  With the recent resurgence of a 
trespass-based analysis in the Court’s Fourth Amendment cases,16 however, it is clear that the 
reasonable expectation of privacy analysis did not supplant the traditional property rights 
intrusion analysis.17  Rather, there are two ways in which a government actor’s conduct can be 
deemed to constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment: (1) if the conduct 
violates a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy; or (2) if the conduct violates a person’s 
property rights, such as by committing trespass.18  
In general, law enforcement officers are required to acquire a search warrant prior to 
conducting a search.19  By requiring prior judicial assessment of whether probable cause exists, 
the warrant requirement provides a judicial check of executive branch power.20  While there are 
some exceptions to the search warrant requirement, unless a search comes within one of the well 
delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement, a warrantless search is presumed to be 
unreasonable.21 
     A. Fourth Amendment Protection of the Sanctity of the Home and Its Curtilage 
                                                          
311-13 (2017); see, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 
456 (1948).  
13 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  
14 Justice, supra note 12, at 314-15; Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.     
15 Justice, supra note 12, at 315.  
16 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013).    
17 Jones, 565 U.S. at 407-12; Justice, supra note 12, at 317-20.   
18 Jones, 565 U.S. at 407-12; Justice, supra note 12, at 309-10, 317-20.  
19 See Andrew Wrona, How Far Can the Automobile Exception Go? How Searches of Computers and Similar 
Devices Push It to the Limit, 43 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1119, 1120 (2010); Katz, The Automobile Exception 
Transformed, supra note 1, at 383.    
20 See Wrona, supra note 19, at 1120-21; Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed, supra note 1, at 384.    
21 See Wrona, supra note 19, at 1120-22; Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed, supra note 1, at 385.      
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Protecting the privacy of the home is at the heart of the Fourth Amendment protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.22  Because of the primacy of privacy in the home, in 
the absence of exigent circumstances, a search warrant is generally required to conduct a search 
of the home.23  Without a warrant, a search of the home is presumptively unreasonable, in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.24   
The courts have extended the heightened Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the 
home to the curtilage, which is the area immediately surrounding the home and associated with 
the intimacies of home life.25  The courts generally determine whether an area is curtilage on a 
case-by-case basis.26  This determination is critical because open fields, the area outside of the 
curtilage, are not protected by the Fourth Amendment.27  In United States v. Dunn (1987),28 the 
Court established four factors to be considered when determining whether an area is part of the 
curtilage of a home: (1) the area’s proximity to the home; (2) the area’s location within an 
enclosure which encircles the home; (3) the purposes for which the area is used; and (4) the 
measures employed to shield the area from public observation.29  However, these factors should 
not be mechanically applied, but rather should be considered useful only in so far as they shed 
light on the relevant question of whether the area is so intimately associated with the home that it 
should receive the same Fourth Amendment protection as the home does.30  Some areas around 
                                                          
22 See Brendan Peters, Fourth Amendment Yard Work: Curtilage’s Mow-Line Rule, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 943, 948 
(2004); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980).  
23 See Amelia L. Diedrich, Secure in Their Yards? Curtilage, Technology, and the Aggravation of the Poverty 
Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 39 Hastings Const. L.Q. 297, 303-05 (2011).  
24 Diedrich, supra note 23, at 305. 
25 See Vanessa Rownaghi, Comment, Driving Into Unreasonableness: The Driveway, the Curtilage, and Reasonable 
Expectations of Privacy, 11 Am. U.J. Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 1165, 1165-66, 1177 (2003); Oliver v. United States, 
466 U.S. 170 (1984).    
26 Rownaghi, supra note 25, at 1175-76.  
27 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).    
28 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).  
29 Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301.  
30 Id.  
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the home may be deemed a classic example of curtilage, without any explicit analysis of the 
Dunn factors, such as when the Court deemed a front porch to be an obvious example of 
curtilage.31  
By treating the curtilage as, in effect, an extension of the home, the court provides a 
buffer area around the home which protects the private activities of a household from 
government intrusion.32  Thus, a warrantless search of a home’s curtilage is presumed to be 
unreasonable, and therefore violate the Fourth Amendment, unless there are exigent 
circumstances justifying the warrantless intrusion.33  
Police officers, however, like any member of the public, are free to observe the curtilage 
as they pass by34 and are even free to enter the curtilage along the standard path leading to a 
home’s front door for the purpose of knocking on the front door, as any visitor may do, since 
such conduct does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.35 There 
is no search when law enforcement officers observe the curtilage from a vantage point where the 
officer has a right to be, such as from an airplane in navigable airspace36 or from the officer’s 
position on a public street,37 because any expectation of privacy in items which are left in plain 
view out in the open of a home’s curtilage where anyone can see them is not an expectation the 
courts are prepared to recognize as reasonable.38  However, before entering the curtilage to 
                                                          
31 Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7 (2013); Orin Kerr, Collins v. Virginia and "the Conception Defining the 
Curtilage": A Familiar Idea "Easily Understood From Our Daily Experience" -- or Is It?, The Volokh Conspiracy, 
May 29, 2018 3:44 pm, https://reason.com/volokh/2018/05/29/collins-v-virginia-and-a-thought-on-curt       
32 Peters, supra note 22, at 951, 955-57; Kerr, Collins v. Virginia and "the Conception Defining the Curtilage," 
supra note 31; Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).    
33 Diedrich, supra note 23, at 305-06.    
34 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986). 
35 Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013).    
36 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213–14.   
37 See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 
102 Mich. L. Rev. 801, 813 (2004). 
38 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14; Diedrich, supra note 23, at.307-09; Donohue, supra note 3, at 589-94.  
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conduct a search or seizure within the curtilage based on such an observation, law enforcement 
officers must secure a warrant (absent exigent circumstances).39  The mere fact that an item, even 
if it is contraband, within the curtilage can be freely observed by passersby from an area where 
the public has a right to be cannot justify a warrantless entry of the curtilage by police officers 
for the purpose of conducting a search or seizure.40  For areas of the curtilage where there is an 
implied invitation for the public to enter the property for a limited purpose, such as the implied 
invitation for people to travel the path which leads from the street to the front door – a path 
which often includes a portion of the driveway -- to knock on the front door to pay a visit, police 
entry of that particular area does not constitute a search as long as the police officer does not 
exceed the scope of the implicit license,41 such as by employing a drug-sniffing dog on a front 
porch.42                
     B. The Automobile Exception to the Fourth Amendment Search Warrant Requirement  
 In Carroll v. United States (1925),43 the Court established the automobile exception to 
the search warrant requirement.44  Due to the mobility of automobiles, their highly regulated 
nature, and the lesser expectation of privacy in automobiles, the Fourth Amendment does not 
require that the police obtain a warrant before conducting a search of an automobile, as long as 
                                                          
39 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983) (plurality 
opinion) (for the plain view doctrine to justify a seizure, the object seized must be in plain view from a lawful 
vantage point at time of observation and the law enforcement officer must have a lawful right of access to the object 
at the time of seizure); Alameda County District Attorney’s Office, Plain View, Point of View, Winter 2015, 
http://le.alcoda.org/publications/point_of_view/files/W15_Plain_View.pdf (last accessed July 25, 2018); Federal 
Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), Plain View (podcast), https://www.fletc.gov/audio/plain-view-mp3 
(last accessed July 25, 2018).   
40 See Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-137; Brown, 460 U.S. at 739 (plurality opinion); Alameda County District Attorney’s 
Office, supra note 39; FLETC, supra note 39.   
41 See Andrew Eppich, Wolf at the Door: Issues of Place and Race in the Use of the “Knock and Talk” Policing 
Technique, 32 B.C.J.L. & Soc. Just. 119, 129-30 (2012).    
42 Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7 (2013).      
43 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
44 Chilcoat, supra note 1, at 919. 
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the police have probable cause for the search.45  Under the automobile exception, the police may 
conduct a search with a scope as extensive as could be authorized if conducted with a warrant.46  
Thus, if the police have probable cause to believe evidence of a crime is contained anywhere 
within the automobile, including in the trunk or inside containers, the police may conduct a 
warrantless search of those areas.47     
Under the automobile exception, the courts do not examine on a case-by-case basis 
whether there were exigent circumstances to justify a search without a warrant.48  Thus, the 
courts will not inquire into whether the automobile being searched was in fact in danger of being 
moved before the police would be able to secure a warrant.49  Rather, the automobile exception is 
a categorical exception – if the item searched is an automobile and the police have probable 
cause to search it, then a warrantless search of the automobile does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.50  To constitute an “automobile” within the meaning of the automobile exception, 
the vehicle must be readily mobile.51   
     C. The Intersection of the Automobile Exception and the Curtilage Doctrine 
Over time, the automobile exception has expanded by making clear that it is a categorical 
exception which applies even when there is no actual exigency (such as when the automobile has 
already been immobilized by law enforcement),52 allowing the search of containers found within 
                                                          
45 Id. at 919-26; Wrona, supra note 19, at 1128-30; Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed, supra note 1, 
passim.     
46 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982); Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed, supra note 1, at 
408.       
47 Ross, 456 U.S. at 825; California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991); Chilcoat, supra note 1, at 922-23; 
Wrona, supra note 18, at 1125, 1130-32; Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed, supra note 1, at 408.        
48 See Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed, supra note 1, passim; see, e.g., Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 
465 (1999); Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U. S. 938 (1996).     
49 See Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed, supra note 1, passim.     
50 See Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed, supra note 1, passim; Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 
(1999).       
51 See Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed, supra note 1, passim.     
52 California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985).  
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the automobile,53 and even applying the automobile exception to motor homes when relevant 
factors indicate it is being used as an automobile.54  Another area where the automobile 
exception has the potential to expand is when the police conduct a search of an automobile 
parked in a home’s curtilage.  Does such a search come within the automobile exception and thus 
not require a warrant?  Or is a warrant required given the heightened Fourth Amendment 
protection afforded to the curtilage? 
  The lower courts have on occasion been confronted with the issue of what happens when 
the police want to search an automobile which is located within the curtilage of a home.  This 
has resulted in a circuit split, with the Seventh,55 Eighth,56 and Ninth Circuits57 (as well as 
Alabama58) holding that the automobile exception permits a warrantless search of an automobile 
parked on the defendant’s private residential property and the Fifth59 and Tenth Circuits60 (as 
well as Georgia61 and Illinois62) either holding or opining that the automobile exception, at least 
in the absence of actual exigent circumstances in the case at hand, does not apply to searches of 
automobiles conducted on the defendant’s private residential property.63  With the lower courts 
grappling with how to resolve the collision of two Fourth Amendment doctrines, the automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement and the heightened Fourth Amendment protection afforded 
to the curtilage of a home, this split of authority set the stage for the Court to resolve the issue in 
                                                          
53 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991). 
54 California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985); Carol A. Chase, Privacy Takes a Back Seat: Putting the Automobile 
Exception Back on Track After Several Wrong Turns, 41 B.C.L. Rev. 71, 73-85 (2000).  
55 United States v. Hines, 449 F.3d 808, 810-15 (7th Cir. 2006). 
56 United States v. Blaylock, 535 F.3d 922, 926-27 (8th Cir. 2008). 
57 United States v. Hatley, 15 F.3d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 1994). 
58 Harris v. State, 948 So.2d 583, 597 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 2006). 
59 United States v. Fields, 456 F.3d 519, 524-25 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Beene, 818 F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 
2016). 
60 United States v. DeJear, 552 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2009). 
61 State v. Vickers, 793 S.E.2d 167, 171 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). 
62 Redwood v. Lierman, 772 N.E.2d 803, 813 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). 
63 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at 18-24, Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. ____, 201 L. Ed. 2d 9 (2018).  Retrieved 
from http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/16-1027-cert-petition.pdf   
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Collins, where the Court finally weighed in on whether the automobile exception applies when 
the automobile is located within the curtilage of the home.   
     III. A Brief History of the Exclusionary Rule 
 Another noteworthy aspect of Collins is Justice Thomas’s concurrence in which he calls 
for the Court to reconsider the propriety of the Court’s imposition of the exclusionary rule upon 
the states.64  In light of this call to revisit this issue, a brief exposition of the history of the 
exclusionary rule will provide a helpful foundation before examining the Court’s opinions in 
Collins.     
 The exclusionary rule provides a mechanism for excluding evidence obtained in violation 
of a defendant’s constitutional rights from criminal court proceedings.65  It is a remedy created 
by the judiciary to deter law enforcement officials from violating constitutional rights.66  The 
exclusionary rule has long been thought necessary due to the impracticality of using costly civil 
litigation as a deterrent and skepticism about the effectiveness of administrative complaint 
procedures due to the problems inherent in relying on the executive branch to police its own 
members.67     
     A. Establishment of the Exclusionary Rule 
 Prior to the establishment of the exclusionary rule, the Bill of Rights, including the 
Fourth Amendment, was little more than a paper tiger.68  Even though the Constitution forbid 
unreasonable searches and seizures, there was little to dissuade law enforcement officers from 
                                                          
64 Collins, 201 L. Ed. 2d at 24-29 (Thomas, J., concurring).    
65 Thomas K. Clancy, The Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment in the Roberts Court, 85 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 191, 
200 (2010).  
66 Id.  
67 See Id. at 201-02; Orin Kerr, Why Does the United States Have an Exclusionary Rule?, The Volokh Conspiracy, 
July 19, 2008 4:14 pm,  http://volokh.com/posts/1216498467.shtml  
68 See Harry M. Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, The Unruly Exclusionary Rule: Heeding Justice Blackmun's Call to 
Examine the Rule in Light of Changing Judicial Understanding About Its Effects Outside the Courtroom, 78 Marq. 
L. Rev. 45, 46 (1994).   
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getting so wrapped up in their pursuit of enforcing the criminal law that they trampled on 
constitutional rights in the process.69  Thus, the Fourth Amendment was largely a right in name 
only, as there was not a feasible, effective enforcement mechanism or remedy.70  
In Weeks v. United States (1914),71 the U.S. Supreme Court first established the 
exclusionary rule.72  However, this rule was only applicable in federal courts.73  Furthermore, it 
only applied when federal law enforcement officials, not state or local law enforcement officials, 
violated constitutional rights to obtain evidence.74  Therefore, state and local law enforcement 
officials could violate a suspect’s constitutional rights to obtain evidence the suspect had violated 
federal law and then hand that evidence over “on a silver platter” to federal officials for a federal 
prosecution.75  The Court, however, closed this particular loophole when it overruled the silver 
platter doctrine in Elkins v. United States.76      
     B. Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule to the States 
Even with that loophole closed, the exclusionary rule only applying in federal courts 
posed a problem since regulation of criminal conduct is primarily a state issue and thus the vast 
majority of criminal prosecutions are for violations of state law and occur in state courts.77  In 
Mapp v Ohio (1961),78 the Court made the exclusionary rule applicable to the states.79  
                                                          
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
72 Donohue, supra note 3, at 565. 
73 Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment's Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Right, 10 Ohio St. J. Crim. 
L. 357, 358 (2012).    
74 Id. at 360.   
75 William Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 1975 Wash. U. L. 
Q. 621, 628 (1975); Jared M. Smith, The Evolution of the Exclusionary Rule: From Weeks v. United States and 
Mapp v. Ohio to Herring v. United States and Hudson v. Michigan, 2 Grove City C. J. of L. & Pub. Pol’y 215, 227-
28.    
76 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Geller, supra note 75, at 630; Smith, supra note 75, at 227-28.       
77 See Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies and Development of the Law: A Comment on Camreta v. Greene 
and Davis v. United States, Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 237, 240 (2010). 
78 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961).  
79 Clancy, Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Right, supra note 73, at 364-65.   
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Thereafter, evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search or seizure could not be 
admitted into evidence at trial in state courts to prove guilt.80  This, of course, provides a 
disincentive to police officers who may be tempted to violate the Fourth Amendment to build a 
case against a suspect since any evidence obtained in this manner could not be used to prove the 
case at trial.81  The line of cases from Weeks to Mapp transformed the Fourth Amendment from a 
paper tiger, which promised rights with no enforcement mechanism, to a constitutional provision 
with a serious bite.82     
The reasoning of the plurality opinion in Mapp indicates the exclusionary rule is an 
individual’s constitutional right and the exclusionary rule serves multiple purposes, including 
deterring law enforcement officers from violating Fourth Amendment rights, facilitating 
consistency between federal and state courts (and thereby preventing federal law enforcement 
officers from handing evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights over to state and 
local prosecutors for use in prosecutions in state courts), and preserving judicial integrity by 
refusing to allow the courts to become complicit in constitutional rights violations.83  However, 
in subsequent years, the Court has retreated from that position and now takes the view that the 
exclusionary rule is a creation of the Court, not a personal constitutional right, and that its 
purpose is deterrence of police misconduct.84  This shift has undermined the robustness of the 
exclusionary rule, which has been narrowed in application due to the Court’s focus on the rule’s 
deterrent purpose.85  
                                                          
80 See Caldwell & Chase, supra note 68, at 47-48. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. At 46-48. 
83 Michael J. Daponde, Comment: Discretion and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: A New Suppression 
Doctrine Based on Judicial Integrity, 30 McGeorge L. Rev. 1293, 1297-1302 (1999).   
84 Id.; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).  
85 Clancy, Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment, supra note 65, at 200-01.  
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     C. Erosion of the Exclusionary Rule   
The Court has slowly eroded the exclusionary rule over time by restricting the rule’s 
application to situations in which the Court deems the benefit of deterring law enforcement 
officials’ misconduct to outweigh the cost to the courts’ truth-finding capacity.86  Using this cost-
benefit analysis approach, the Court has restricted the application of the exclusionary rule by 
establishing certain exceptions, such as the good faith exception.87  Under the good faith 
exception, evidence will not be excluded when it was obtained while acting in objectively 
reasonable reliance on: (1) a warrant subsequently found to have been issued without probable 
cause;88 (2) a statute later held to be unconstitutional;89 (3) the court clerk’s computer records, 
which were inaccurate (unbeknownst to the police officer);90 or (4) binding precedent which was 
subsequently overruled.91  In each of the aforementioned situations, the costs of excluding the 
evidence would outweigh the benefits because the exclusionary rule could not serve its deterrent 
purpose since there was no police misconduct, as the police officer acted in objectively 
reasonable reliance on a third party (a party other than law enforcement) – a judge, the 
legislature, the court clerk’s office, or the appellate court.92  The cost-benefit calculation is 
clearly informed by the premise that the exclusionary rule’s purpose is deterrence of police 
misconduct, not errors of the judicial or legislative branches of government.93  
                                                          
86 Catherine Cruikshank, Dismantling the Exclusionary Rule: United States v. Leon and the Courts of Washington – 
Should Good Faith Excuse Bad Acts?, 9 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 415, 415-17, 422-31 (1985); Clancy, Irrelevancy of 
the Fourth Amendment, supra note 65, at 200-01; see generally Clancy, Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional 
Right, supra note 73.  
87 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Cruikshank, supra note 86, at 425-31.  
88 Leon, 468 U.S. at 897-900, 922-25.  
89 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 340-42, 346-55 (1987).  
90 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 2-3, 10-16 (1995).  
91 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423-24 (2011); Kit Kinports, Culpability, Deterrence, and the 
Exclusionary Rule, 21Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 821 (2013).   
92 Kinports, supra note 91, at 824-28. 
93 Id.; Cruikshank, supra note 86, at 428-29.     
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The Court’s restriction of the application of the exclusionary rule based on a cost-benefit 
calculation is not limited to situations where law enforcement officers acted in good faith while 
reasonably relying on the work of judicial or legislative branch actors.94  In Hudson v. Michigan 
(2006),95 the Court employed a cost-benefit analysis when it decided that the exclusionary rule 
would not apply when law enforcement officers violate the knock and announce requirement for 
the execution of search warrants, regardless of the officer’s culpability.96  Because there is no 
strong incentive to violate the knock and announce requirement since such violations are 
unlikely to yield more evidence, the Court deemed it unnecessary to apply the exclusionary rule 
to knock and announce violations in the modern context, given the professionalization of 
policing and the availability of civil litigation as a remedy.97  Thus, there is a general exception 
to the exclusionary rule for knock and announce violations, even when police officers act in bad 
faith, because the cost of applying the rule to such violations outweighs any benefits.98 
The Court has also refused to apply the exclusionary rule to cases of Fourth Amendment 
violations committed due to law enforcement negligence which is attenuated from the police 
officer’s constitutional rights violation.99  In Herring v. United States,100 the Court found that the 
exclusionary rule did not apply to evidence obtained as a result of an arrest made in reliance on 
another police department’s computer records indicating an outstanding arrest warrant where 
those computer records were in error due to police department negligence in failing to update the 
records.101  The Court focused on the arresting officer’s lack of a culpable mental state and 
                                                          
94 Kinports, supra note 91, at 829. 
95 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).  
96 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594-96; Kinports, supra note 91, at 829.  
97 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597-98; Kinports, supra note 91, at 829. 
98 Kinports, supra note 91, at 829. 
99 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009); Kinports, supra note 91, at 830-32.  
100 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).  
101 Herring, 555 U.S. at 135, 141-48.    
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reasoned that application of the exclusionary rule to a case of isolated negligence would not 
further the rule’s deterrent purpose.102  Once again, the Court found that the costs of applying the 
exclusionary rule would outweigh any benefits.103        
The Court’s modern view of the exclusionary rule’s origin and rationale has laid the 
groundwork for the ongoing erosion of the rule and possibly even reconsideration of the rule’s 
continued existence at some point.104  If the rule is solely justified by deterrence, then it should 
not be applied when this would serve no deterrent purpose.105  Also, if the rule is merely a 
judicial creation, rather than a constitutional right, then the Court is free to reconsider the 
wisdom of the exclusionary rule entirely, particularly if the Court decides modern conditions 
render the exclusionary rule less necessary than it was at the time of its adoption.106  
Furthermore, if the exclusionary rule is a court-created rule of evidence, rather than a 
constitutional right, this may call into question the propriety of the Court making the 
exclusionary rule applicable to the states.107    
     D. Other Remedies for Fourth Amendment Violations  
 The other remedies for Fourth Amendment violations include administrative complaint 
procedures and civil litigation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.108  However, these remedies have 
limitations with regard to serving as an effective deterrent to violations of Fourth Amendment 
rights.109  Administrative complaint procedures are problematic because they rely on the 
                                                          
102 Herring, 555 U.S. at 135, 141-48; Clancy, Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment, supra note 65, at 203-07; 
Kinports, supra note 91, at 830-32.  
103 Herring, 555 U.S. at 135, 141-48; Kinports, supra note 91, at 830-32.   
104 Clancy, Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment, supra note 65, at 200.  
105 Id. at 200-01.  
106 Id. at 200-02; Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597-99 (2006).  
107 Clancy, Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Right, supra note 73, at 366-67, 371, 390.     
108 Clancy, Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment, supra note 65, at 201-02; Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597-99.   
109 Clancy, Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment, supra note 65, at 203. 
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executive branch policing its own members.110  Civil litigation is often impractical due to the 
costs of litigation and the inability to establish substantial damages in many cases.111  Holding 
the police accountable through civil litigation is also limited by the doctrine of qualified 
immunity, as the police can only be held liable if there was a violation of a clearly established 
constitutional right.112    
 Given the limitations of these alternative remedies, the continuing erosion of the 
exclusionary rule is concerning.  Will the rule eventually be eroded to the point that the Fourth 
Amendment once again becomes an empty promise, with no feasible and effective remedy?113  
Will the exclusionary rule die a death by a thousand cuts?                  
     IV. Collins v. Virginia (2018) 
 In Collins v. Virginia (2018),114 the Court was confronted with the issue of whether the 
automobile exception applies when the automobile is located in a home’s curtilage.115  This case 
deals with the intersection of two important Fourth Amendment doctrines – the automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement and the curtilage doctrine, which extends the heightened 
Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the home to the home’s curtilage.116  Given that the 
Court had repeatedly expanded the automobile exception since its inception,117 would the court 
                                                          
110 Samuel Walker & Carol Archbold, Mediating Citizen Complaints against the Police: An Exploratory Study, 2000 
J. Disp. Resol. 231, 232-34 (2000); Kerr, Why Does the United States Have an Exclusionary Rule?, supra note 67.   
111 Clancy, Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment, supra note 65, at 203; see Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies, 
supra note 77, at 242; David E. Steinberg, The Drive Toward Warrantless Auto Searches: Suggestions from a Back 
Seat Driver, 80 B.U.L. Rev. 545, 564 (2000); Andrew E. Taslitz, Hypocrisy, Corruption, and Illegitimacy: Why 
Judicial Integrity Justifies the Exclusionary Rule, 10 Ohio State J. of Criminal Law 419, 427-28 (2013).  
112 Clancy, Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment, supra note 65, at 196-97; Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies, 
supra note 77, at 241.     
113 See Taslitz, supra note 111, at 424-30.        
114 Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. __, 201 L. Ed. 2d 9 (2018).  
115 Collins, 201 L. Ed. 2d at 16.   
116 Id. at 17.  
117 Chase, supra note 54, at 73-85.  
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draw a line at the curtilage and refuse to allow the automobile exception to expand in a manner 
which would trample the Fourth Amendment protection normally afforded to the curtilage?      
     A. Facts of Collins v. Virginia  
While investigating traffic violations involving a motorcyclist who evaded detention, 
police discovered the motorcycle was likely stolen and in Ryan Collins’ possession.118  After 
seeing photographs showing the motorcycle parked in a home’s driveway on Collins’ Facebook 
profile, a police officer parked on the street near that house and observed a motorcycle covered 
by a tarp parked at the top of the driveway.119  The officer walked up the driveway, removed the 
tarp, and saw a motorcycle similar in appearance to the motorcycle involved in the traffic 
violations.120  The officer ran a check on the license plate and vehicle identification number to 
confirm it was a stolen vehicle, took a photograph of the motorcycle, replaced the tarp, and 
returned to his police car on the street.121  After Collins came home, the officer knocked on the 
front door of the home and during the subsequent conversation Collins admitted to buying the 
motorcycle without title.122  Collins was arrested and charged with receipt of stolen property.123   
The trial court denied a motion to suppress the evidence acquired via the warrantless 
search.124  On appeal of Collins’ conviction, the Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed, holding 
exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search, and the Supreme Court of Virginia also 
affirmed, holding that the warrantless search was proper under the automobile exception to the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.125  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
                                                          
118 Collins, 201 L. Ed. 2d at 16.   
119 Id.  
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 16-17.  
122 Id. at 17.  
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id.  
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decide whether the automobile exception allows warrantless entry by the police into a home’s 
curtilage for the purpose of searching an automobile parked within the curtilage.126   
      B. Overview of Opinions in Collins v. Virginia  
In an 8-1 vote, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the automobile exception does not 
allow a warrantless intrusion upon a home’s curtilage to search a vehicle parked in the driveway 
and accordingly reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia.127  The Court 
remanded the case for the state courts to consider whether another exception to the warrant 
requirement, such as exigent circumstances, may apply and thus render the warrantless entry of 
the curtilage reasonable.128   
In the majority opinion, written by Justice Sotomayor, the Court clarified that the 
automobile exception cannot justify a warrantless intrusion into the curtilage of a home to search 
an automobile located within the home’s curtilage because entry into the curtilage implicates a 
separate privacy interest.129  Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion in which he agreed with 
the result reached by the majority, but questioned the validity of the Court imposing the 
exclusionary rule upon state courts and argued that the Court should reconsider this issue in a 
proper case.130  In his dissent, Justice Alito opined that the search was reasonable and argued that 
requiring a warrant to search a vehicle parked in a house’s driveway when a warrant would not 
be required to search that vehicle if parked on the street in front of that house made little 
sense.131    
     C. Majority Opinion in Collins v. Virginia  
                                                          
126 Id. at 16.  
127 Id. at 24. 
128 Id.at 16,24.  
129 Id. at 19-20, 24.   
130 Id. at 24, 29 (Thomas, J. concurring).  
131 Id. at 30-33 (Alito, J, dissenting).  
COLLINS V. VIRGINIA PROTECTS CURTILAGE  19 
In Collins v. Virginia (2018),132 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the automobile 
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement does not allow law enforcement to 
make a warrantless entry into a home’s curtilage for the purpose of searching an automobile 
parked within the home’s curtilage.133  In doing so, the Court clarified an issue that arises at the 
juncture of two Fourth Amendment doctrines:  the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement and the heightened Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the home and its 
curtilage.134   
Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor noted that the portion of the driveway on 
which the motorcycle was parked, which was adjacent to the house and was enclosed on three 
sides by a brick wall and the side of the house, was part of the curtilage of the home, which is 
treated as part of the home for Fourth Amendment purposes.135  She observed that the officer’s 
entry into the home’s curtilage for the purpose of searching an automobile encroaches on two 
distinct privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment: an individual’s privacy interest in 
an automobile and the individual’s privacy interest in the home’s curtilage.136  Justice Sotomayor 
reasoned that just as the automobile exception could not justify a police officer entering a house 
without a warrant to search an automobile which is parked inside the house and visible through a 
window to all who pass by, the automobile exception cannot justify the police entering the 
curtilage of a house without a warrant to search an automobile which is parked within the 
curtilage.137   
                                                          
132 Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. ____, 201 L. Ed. 2d 9 (2018).   
133 Collins, 201 L. Ed. 2d at 16.  
134 Id. at 17. 
135 Id. at 19.  
136 Id. at 19. 
137 Id. at 19-20. 
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Justice Sotomayor emphasized that the automobile exception’s scope is limited to the 
confines of the automobile.138  She reasoned that extending the scope of the automobile 
exception to permit a warrantless search of a home’s curtilage to gain access to a vehicle would 
undermine the privacy interest in the home and its curtilage, which is at the heart of the Fourth 
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.139 Justice Sotomayor noted 
that such an extension is not justified based on the rationales for the automobile exception, which 
are based on balancing the government interest in searching a vehicle and an individual’s privacy 
interest in a vehicle, not the privacy interest in a home.140  Therefore, the Court declined to 
extend the scope of the automobile exception to encompass the area in which the automobile is 
parked when that area is protected by the Fourth Amendment, as the home and curtilage are.141   
Justice Sotomayor observed that just as other exceptions to the warrant requirement, such 
as the plain view exception, require that police first have a lawful right of access, the police are 
required to have a lawful right of access to the vehicle before they can conduct a search of a 
vehicle under the automobile exception.142  She reasoned that the automobile exception cannot 
provide that lawful right of access to the vehicle when the vehicle is parked within the curtilage 
of a home because the automobile exception cannot justify encroaching upon the distinct Fourth 
Amendment interest in the home and its curtilage.143 Thus, without a search warrant, entry into 
the curtilage of a home for the purpose of conducting a search of an automobile violates the 
Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the home and its curtilage.144    
                                                          
138 Id. at 20.  
139 Id. at 20. 
140 Id. at 18, 21. 
141 Id. at 20. 
142 Id. at 21. 
143 Id. at 21. 
144 Id. at 19-22.   
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The Court rejected the state’s proposed bright line rule, which would have permitted 
warrantless entry into the curtilage for the purpose of searching an automobile with the exception 
of any enclosed structure, for several reasons.145  First, there is no reason to think such a rule is 
necessary to reduce confusion, as police officers are accustomed to making determinations 
regarding whether an area is curtilage.146  Second, being able to see into the curtilage from a 
lawful vantage point does not give law enforcement the right to make a warrantless entry into the 
curtilage to conduct a search.147  Thus, the proposed bright line rule errs in according such 
importance to the absence of a structure shielding an area from public view.148  Finally, the 
proposed rule would undermine the heightened Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the 
curtilage by deeming some types of curtilage, those not enclosed in a structure, as not being 
protected against warrantless entry for the purpose of searching an automobile and thereby 
privilege the affluent over those who cannot afford to buy homes with garages.149         
 In sum, the Court held that, in the absence of exigent circumstances or consent, a search 
warrant is required for the police to enter the curtilage of a home for the purpose of searching an 
automobile parked within the curtilage.150  The majority reasoned that the automobile exception 
cannot justify a warrantless search of a vehicle which is parked within the curtilage of a home 
because the scope of the automobile exception is limited to the confines of the automobile, the 
automobile exception cannot give the police the requisite lawful right of access to the vehicle 
which must be in place before a search can come within the automobile exception, and entering 
the curtilage of a home implicates a distinct Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the curtilage 
                                                          
145 Id. at 23-24. 
146 Id. at 23.  
147 Id.  
148 Id. at 23-24. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 19-22.   
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in addition to the privacy interest in the automobile itself.151  Therefore, when an automobile is 
parked within the curtilage of a home, the automobile exception cannot obviate the usual need 
for a search warrant before law enforcement officers can enter the curtilage for the purpose of 
conducting a search – even if they seek to search an automobile.152  
     D. Concurring Opinion in Collins v. Virginia  
Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion153 in which he agreed with the majority 
opinion’s resolution of the issue presented, but wrote separately to question the Court’s authority 
to require state courts to apply the exclusionary rule when there is a Fourth Amendment 
violation, as is currently required by precedent.154  Justice Thomas noted that suppression of 
evidence in criminal trials as a means of deterring illegal searches and seizures did not exist at 
the time our Constitution was written.155  He observed that although Mapp suggested the 
exclusionary rule was constitutionally required, in subsequent cases the Court retreated from 
such dicta and clarified that the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally required, but rather is a 
judicial creation.156    
Justice Thomas observed that the Court describes the exclusionary rule as federal law and 
assumes it is applicable in state courts.157  He reasoned that since the exclusionary rule is neither 
constitutionally required nor enacted via federal legislation, the exclusionary rule must be federal 
common law – in which case the exclusionary rule is not binding on the states, as the 
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause only makes the Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties the 
                                                          
151 Id.  
152 Id.  
153 Collins v. Virginia, 201 L. Ed. 2d 9, 24-29 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
154 Id. at 24. 
155 Id. at 25.  
156 Id. at 26-27.  
157 Id. at 27. 
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supreme law of the land and does not grant supremacy to the federal common law.158  Justice 
Thomas noted that while the Court has recognized certain areas of federal judicially created law 
as binding on the states, this has been limited to areas involving the Unites States’ sovereign 
duties and interstate or international matters – and the exclusionary rule does not pertain to either 
of those areas.159  Aside from these limited areas, state law applies unless the issue is controlled 
by the Constitution or federal statute.160   
Justice Thomas argued that since the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally required nor 
created by federal statute, it is doubtful that the Court has the authority to require state courts to 
apply the exclusionary rule.161  Accordingly, Justice Thomas urged the Court to reconsider this 
issue in light of the Court’s modern precedents, which do not support mandating that state courts 
apply the exclusionary rule.162   
     E. Dissenting Opinion in Collins v. Virginia  
 In his dissenting opinion,163 Justice Alito opined that the search was reasonable and thus 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.164  In Justice Alito’s estimation, requiring a warrant for 
the police to walk up a driveway of a house to search a motorcycle but permitting a warrantless 
search of a motorcycle parked at the curb in front of that house is unreasonable because it out of 
step with the practical realities of life.165  Justice Alito emphasized that a finding that the search 
occurred within the curtilage is not determinative, as the relevant issue is whether the search was 
reasonable.166 
                                                          
158 Id. at 27-28.  
159 Id. at 28-29.  
160 Id. at 29.  
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162 Id.   
163 Collins v. Virginia, 201 L. Ed. 2d 9, 29-32 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting).  
164 Id. at 29.   
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Justice Alito argued that there is no good reason the automobile exception should not 
apply to a search of an automobile parked in a driveway of a house since the rationales for the 
automobile exception are no less valid when a vehicle is parked in a driveway than when the 
vehicle is parked along the curb of the house on a public street.167  A vehicle parked in the 
driveway of a house and covered with a tarp is no less readily mobile than if the vehicle were 
parked at the curb in front of that house on a public street and covered with a tarp.168  And no 
greater privacy interests are at stake when a motorcycle is parked in the driveway of a house 
rather than being parked on the street at the curb in front of that house, as a police officer’s brief 
walk up the driveway of a house, during which the officer cannot see anything that was not 
already visible from the street, does not impair any real privacy interests.169  
Justice Alito stressed that the automobile exception is an exigency-based categorical 
exception premised on the inherent exigency presented by automobiles’ ready mobility.170  Thus, 
a case-specific inquiry into whether obtaining a warrant was impractical is unnecessary.171  
Justice Alito proposed that courts conduct a case-specific inquiry regarding the degree of 
intrusion on privacy interests to determine whether a search of an automobile located on private 
property is reasonable.172  Thus, a warrantless search of an automobile parked in the driveway of 
a home in full view of anyone on the street pursuant to the automobile exception is reasonable 
since walking up the driveway is no more than a negligible intrusion on privacy interests, as in 
the present case; whereas, a warrantless search of an automobile parked inside a house would be 
unreasonable due to the greater intrusion on privacy interests such a search would entail.173    
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     V. Implications 
Collins v. Virginia174 establishes the rule that the automobile exception cannot justify a 
warrantless search of an automobile parked within the curtilage of a home because that exception 
applies only to the search of the automobile, not to the separate intrusion upon the curtilage to 
gain access to the automobile.175  Thus, in the absence of either consent to the search or exigent 
circumstances, the police must obtain a warrant prior to entering the curtilage of a home for the 
purpose of searching an automobile.176  This clarifies an important issue which arises at the 
intersection of the automobile exception and the curtilage doctrine.   
The Court’s holding in Collins rebuffs an attempt to extend the automobile exception in a 
manner which would have seriously undermined the heightened Fourth Amendment protection 
afforded to a home’s curtilage.  This ruling ensures that the requirement for the police to obtain a 
warrant prior to searching a home or its curtilage cannot evaporate simply because an automobile 
is parked there.  It is a significant win for privacy, holding the line against governmental 
overreaching.   
While the automobile exception has expanded considerably since its inception,177 Collins 
protects the curtilage from being encroached upon by the automobile exception.  This is not 
surprising given the Court’s recent resurgent emphasis on property rights infringement as a 
useful framework for Fourth Amendment analysis178 and the Court’s recent trend of erring on the 
                                                          
174 Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. __, 201 L. Ed. 2d 9 (2018).  
175 Id. at 16, 19-22.  
176 Id.  
177 Chilcoat, supra note 1, passim.  
178 The recent resurgence of a property rights infringement based analysis in the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
decisions is exemplified by the Court’s trespass-based Fourth Amendment analysis in Unites States v. Jones, 565 
U.S. 400 (2012), and its reiteration in Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013), of the importance of protecting the 
curtilage.  See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Personal Curtilage: Fourth Amendment Security, 55 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 1283, 1288 (2014).    
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side of protecting privacy rights.179  Although requiring a warrant to search an automobile parked 
in a home’s driveway when a warrant would not be required to search an automobile parked a 
short distance from there on a public street in front of the home may appear arbitrary to some,180 
Collins clearly reflects the importance the Court attaches to upholding the heightened Fourth 
Amendment protection of a home and its curtilage and its unwillingness to use the automobile 
exception to chip away at that protection in service of more effective crime control.181 
Also notable is the Court’s refusal to privilege enclosed curtilage over unenclosed 
curtilage, which would have given greater privacy protection to the affluent than to those with 
more limited means.182  By clarifying that the automobile exception extends no further than the 
confines of the automobile itself and cannot justify warrantless entry of a home’s curtilage for 
the purpose of searching an automobile, regardless of whether the automobile is parked on a 
driveway or inside a garage, the Court has preserved the heightened Fourth Amendment 
protection afforded to a home’s curtilage for all types of curtilage, rather than deeming certain 
types of curtilage (enclosed structures) more worthy of protection than others.183  Given the 
scholarly criticism which has been leveled at the manner in which the courts apply the curtilage 
doctrine to the disadvantage of the poor, who tend to occupy multiple-occupant dwellings 
surrounded by common areas which may not be afforded heightened protection due to the 
occupant’s inability to exclude others from such common areas,184 the Court’s refusal to 
                                                          
179 In recent years, the Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions have evinced great concern for the importance of 
protecting privacy, particularly in light of the intrusiveness of modern technology when employed for law 
enforcement purposes. See, e.g., Unites States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. __, 134 
S. Ct. 2473, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430 (2014); Carpenter v. United States 201 L. Ed. 2d 507 (2018).     
180 Collins, 201 L. Ed. 2d at 29-30. (Alito, J. dissenting opinion); John Leon, Collins v. Virginia: Where Categorical 
Rules Collide, NULRO Blog, February 23, 2018, http://blog.northwesternlaw.review/?p=596   
181 See Leon, Where Categorical Rules Collide, supra note 180.    
182 Collins v. Virginia, 201 L. Ed. 2d 9, 23-24 (2018).   
183 Id. at 19-24.  
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privilege costly enclosed structures, such as garages within the curtilage, over more affordable 
unenclosed spaces, such as driveways or carports within the curtilage,185 while explicitly noting 
the economic discriminatory effect such a rule would have is an encouraging step in the right 
direction.   
In Collins, the Court treated the determination of whether the area where the motorcycle 
was parked was curtilage as an easy call.186  However, it is unclear whether this finding is 
uniquely tied to the unusual facts in Collins, where the motorcycle was parked on a portion of the 
driveway which was close to the house and within a semi-private nook enclosed on three sides 
by retaining walls and the side wall of the house.187  It is unknown whether the Court would 
deem a more typical situation of an automobile parked in a driveway in front of a house’s 
attached garage, with no walls around the area providing any semblance of privacy, and not far 
from the public street as a similarly easy call or whether the Court would apply the Dunn factors 
to determine on a case-by-case basis whether each particular driveway is curtilage.188  Will the 
Court deem driveways, generally, a classic example of curtilage, as the Court has labeled front 
porches?189  Only time will tell, as we must await future court decisions on this issue.  
The final outcome for the petitioner in Collins remains to be seen.  Mr. Collins may not 
ultimately prevail on remand if the state appellate court finds there were exigent circumstances 
justifying the warrantless intrusion into the curtilage in this case.  Even if the state appellate 
court finds there was a Fourth Amendment violation and Mr. Collins thus prevails on remand, 
any attempts by Mr. Collins or other similarly situated individuals to hold the police civilly liable 
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for a past warrantless search of an automobile parked within the curtilage of a home in the 
absence of exigent circumstances will likely fail due to qualified immunity since the law will 
likely be deemed as not having been clearly established prior to Collins.   
But regardless of what may happen in any of these existing individual cases, Collins 
establishes an important rule which the police must follow going forward, thus giving guidance 
to both law enforcement officers and courts regarding the interplay of the automobile exception 
and the curtilage doctrine.  In Collins, the Court has clearly sent the message that the automobile 
exception does not permit warrantless intrusion into a home’s curtilage for the purpose of 
searching an automobile.190  Going forward, any attempts to rely on the automobile exception as 
a justification for a warrantless search of an automobile parked in a home’s curtilage will fail 
under the precedent set by Collins and, if the search cannot be upheld on other grounds (such as 
exigent circumstances or consent), any evidence obtained through such a search will be 
inadmissible in a criminal trial as evidence of guilt.  Furthermore, a civil suit to remedy such a 
constitutional rights violation should not be barred by qualified immunity, as Collins has now 
clearly established this area of law.             
 Collins is also notable for Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in which he clearly 
signaled he will be looking for any opportunity to re-examine the applicability of the 
exclusionary rule to criminal prosecutions in state courts.191  The composition of the Court is 
currently undergoing a shift to the right due to the upcoming replacement of recently retired 
Justice Kennedy, who has often played a pivotal role as a swing vote.192  Given the age of some 
                                                          
190 Collins v. Virginia, 201 L. Ed. 2d 9, 16 (2018). 
191 Id. at 29 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
192 See Lawrence Hurley, Justice Kennedy to retire, Trump has chance to reshape Supreme Court, Reuters, June 17, 
2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-kennedy/justice-kennedy-to-retire-trump-has-chance-to-reshape-
supreme-court-idUSKBN1JN2OF  
COLLINS V. VIRGINIA PROTECTS CURTILAGE  29 
of the other Justices, the current President may have further opportunities to appoint additional 
conservative Justices, depending on the timing of any further departures from the Court and the 
length of the President’s tenure in office.193  As the Court gains more conservative Justices, 
Justice Thomas may be able to recruit new Justices and persuade some of the existing 
conservative Justices to join him in pushing for the Court to reconsider its authority to impose 
the exclusionary rule upon state courts.  Given the recent trend in the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence towards severely limiting the application of the exclusionary rule based on a cost-
benefit analysis to only situations where applying the exclusionary rule has the potential to 
ostensibly effectively deter future police misconduct (and the Court’s corresponding 
acknowledgment that the exclusionary rule is a judicial creation with a deterrent purpose, not a 
constitutional right),194 the idea that the Court may be headed towards an eventual re-
examination of whether the exclusionary rule can apply to the states is not far-fetched.  And this 
would not be the first time that the Court eventually adopted a view on an important 
constitutional issue which Justice Thomas had previously espoused in a concurring opinion, in 
which no other Justices joined.195   
If the Court were to grant certiorari in a future case to reconsider the issue of whether the 
Court has the authority to impose the exclusionary rule upon state courts and decide to overrule 
Mapp, this could greatly undermine our constitutional rights.  Given that the vast majority of 
prosecutions occur in the state courts,196 if the exclusionary rule were no longer applicable to the 
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states, in those states which do not have a state equivalent of the exclusionary rule the Fourth 
Amendment and other important provisions of the Bill of Rights may be rendered largely 
ineffectual due to a lack of feasible remedies and effective disincentives to trampling on 
constitutional rights in the pursuit of crime control objectives.197  In those states that do not have 
their own exclusionary rule, there would be little effective redress for Fourth Amendment 
violations, as civil lawsuits are often impractical in light of the resources necessary to bring 
litigation and administrative complaint procedures can be problematic since they rely on the 
executive branch policing its own members.198  Additionally, the Court’s recent jurisprudence 
has signaled a troubling trend of ruling in favor of the police on qualified immunity issues,199 
further eroding any possibility that civil liability could be an effective deterrent to constitutional 
violations by the police.200     
Overruling Mapp has the potential to significantly undermine the strides which have been 
made in the professionalization of law enforcement, as there will be less incentive for police 
departments to invest in the continual training necessary to keep officers abreast of developments 
in constitutional law.201  Furthermore, if the exclusionary rule were to cease being available as a 
remedy against unconstitutional conduct committed by state and local police, this might hinder 
the development of case law concerning the contours of the Fourth Amendment, as criminal 
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defendants would be less likely to raise Fourth Amendment issues for the courts to resolve – and 
this is particularly concerning since today’s rapid technological developments give rise to a great 
need for the courts to decide how settled Fourth Amendment principles apply in light of new 
technologies.202  Finally, overruling Mapp would harm the legitimacy of the courts, as seeing the 
courts accept evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights, and thereby implicitly 
sanction such violations, would undermine public confidence in the courts as a body which 
upholds the law.203  
     VI. Conclusion  
 Collins v. Virginia (2018)204 sets an important precedent which prevents the automobile 
exception from undermining the curtilage doctrine.  Collins establishes that the police cannot 
rely on the automobile exception to enter the curtilage of a home without a warrant for the 
purpose of searching an automobile.205  Instead, when the police have probable cause to search 
an automobile and that automobile is parked within a home’s curtilage, the police must secure a 
warrant before conducting the search to justify the intrusion upon the curtilage (unless there are 
exigent circumstances or there is consent to the search).206   
This is an important victory for the privacy we all enjoy in our homes and their curtilage.  
The fact that an automobile, which the police have probable cause to search, is parked in the 
curtilage of a home does not give the police carte blanche to enter the curtilage and conduct a 
search without a warrant.207  Collins reminds the police that, in the absence of exigent 
circumstances or consent, they must get a warrant before conducting a search within the curtilage 
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of a home, regardless of what item is the object of the search -- even if it is an automobile.208  
This preserves the important judicial check on executive branch power inherent in requiring a 
judicial determination of probable cause prior to a search of a home or its curtilage.209  It also 
clarifies the interplay of two doctrines, the automobile exception and the curtilage doctrine, for 
law enforcement and the lower courts.    
In the wake of a long-term expansion of the automobile exception which begged the 
question of whether this expansion would see no end,210 Collins serves as an important signal 
that the automobile exception does have an important limit: it stops at the edges of the 
automobile and thus cannot justify intrusion upon the area surrounding the automobile when an 
automobile is parked in a home’s curtilage.211  As we move into an era where cars increasingly 
incorporate new technologies which result in automobiles containing far more information than 
they did in the past, it remains to be seen whether the Court will further reign in the automobile 
exception.212  Given our ability in modern times to quickly obtain warrants through electronic 
means213 and the wealth of information which may be present in automated and connected 
cars,214 as such technologically advanced vehicles become more common, how might the Court 
further halt or reverse the expansion of the automobile exception?  Will the Court carve out an 
exception to the automobile exception prohibiting warrantless searches of the technology 
incorporated into automobiles, similar to the Riley v. California (2014)215 holding requiring a 
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warrant for searches of cell phones found on persons incident to arrest?216  Or might the Court 
reconsider the automobile exception altogether in light of the privacy concerns raised by the 
great amount of data stored in such vehicles and the relative speed with which warrants can now 
be obtained?217  As the distinctions between automobiles and computers blur due to advances in 
technology,218 will the Court reconsider the wisdom of having an automobile exception?  
Whether the court will put the brakes on the automobile exception in the future due to the 
implications of technological advances remains to be seen, but for now the Court has at least 
imposed an important limit on the previously ever-expanding automobile exception: the 
automobile exception goes no further than the confines of the automobile itself.219      
Justice Thomas’s concurrence raises the specter of what the future may hold for an 
exclusionary rule which has been under sustained attack for many years now.  While it remains 
to be seen whether anything will become of Justice Thomas’s musings regarding his skepticism 
of the Court’s authority to impose the exclusionary rule on the states, as the Court’s composition 
shifts to the right, this bears watching.220  If Justice Thomas is able to persuade enough Justices 
that the Court should reconsider Mapp, this has the potential for a seismic shift in the remedies 
available to criminal defendants whose constitutional rights have been violated and a consequent 
retrenchment of Mapp’s legacy of professionalizing policing by removing incentives for police 
departments to maintain proper accountability mechanisms and police training on legal issues.221         
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